All Out War

The Full Story of Brexit

Tim Shipman's account of the Brexit Saga was a Sunday Times Book of the Year. There is a lesson here: the Sunday Times Book of the Year Award is not worth winning, for this winner is a very poorly-written book.

Mr Shipman certainly does not lack support from the great and the good. Gracing the cover are such comments as: A Must Read – Nick Robinson; Essential – Andrew Marr; Utterly Gripping – Economist; Stonklingly Good - Fraser Nelson; The Best Political Book of the Year – New Statesman; Superlative . . . Does Full Justice To A Momentous Time – Peter Osborne; One of the Best Political Journalists of His Era – Ian Dale

This is the kind of book which will appeal to the intelligensia and the litterati. The public? Probably about as much as the actual Brexit debate, which, as Tim reminds us, was full of half-truths, sound-bites and misinformation – on both sides.

Having said that, it is of interest to all who are trying to understand how Brexit happened and what might happen next. "Those who do not learn history are doomed to repeat it."

The quote is most likely due to George Santayana, and in its original form it read, ‘Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.’

We must start with some background. The UK entered the Common Market in In the first week of 1973. The week Britain joined the Common Market, the Government put on a festival of European culture so that the British people could share what their Prime Minister, Edward Heath, called his “heart full of joy” at their country's shiny new Euro-future. In 1975 the UK held a referendum on continued membership of the European Community. 67% of the voters supported staying in the EU.

In the 60's and 70's, it was primarily the Labour Party which was very sceptical of Britain's membership of the EU, although equally there was always a Euro-septic wing of the Tory Party. People like Tony Benn and Michael Foot realised that the EU was, and is, essentially a capitalist organisation opposed to the brand of socialism they were hoping to bring to Britain. We see echoes of this train of thought in the very lukewarm Labour Remain campaign as fronted by Jeremy Corbyn. In fact, Tim Shipman identifies Labour's approach as critical to the eventual success of Vote Leave.

However the main “culprit” in this monument to man's hubris and capacity for miscalculation has to be David Cameron. Remember the great line in Guys and Dolls when Marlon Brando says “Daddy, I've got cider in my ear”. For Brando read Cameron.

”Turning the book on its head we get to David's débâcle after about 600 pages. “. . . it did not matter enough to him that he should win.” As a Labour MP said after Cameron had resigned, “He's the only prime minister in my adult life time who has treated it as just another job, rather than a vocation.” Ironically, it was his victory in the election of 2015 which led to his downfall. Having entered the campaign in coalition with the Liberal Democrats and believing he must see off the threat of UKIP, Cameron promised an in-out referendum if he won. He must have thought that in coalition with the Lib-Dems this would never have to take place – as they are the most pro-European party in Parliament. He was wrong – big time. The Lib-Dems's were wiped out and with a majority of 12 he was boxed into the corner by his own Euro-septic wing and the constant carping of UKIP and had to deliver on his referendum pledge.

He found himself at the head of a government committed to a referendum (which was non-binding, although almost no-one can be found who will even admit this – much less even anyone who will stop parroting the “will of the people must be respected” line.

The majority of Tim Shipman's analysis (about 500 pages to be precise) concerns characters the general public have neither ever heard of nor give a hoot about. His contention that it was the faceless leaders of the Leave campaign (to paraphrase the Sun) wot won it is clear.

So much has been written about the Labour Party's role in delivering Brexit, Shipman does not flinch from laying most of the blame on the leader, Jeremy Corbyn. He reminds us that. “. . . no-one disputes that for much of his career he was a dedicated and consistent opponent of British membership of the European Union.” Jeremy Corbin could not and would not deliver the Labour vote for Remain. The truth is - it was the vote in the Labour heartlands which delivered the 600 000 majority to leave. And, it was Jeremy's fault. At the end of the day he is a paid up member of the Tony Benn and Michael Foot fan club.

Meanwhile David Cameron spent most of his remaining time as PM trying to get the EU to agree some kind of a deal which would allow him to sell membership to the Conservative Party and then to the rest of the country. He worked hard at it, but with no success. Much of Shipman's book explains how and why he failed. Certainly the leadership of the EU and Angela Merkel bear a lot of the responsibility. They just couldn't envision how or why the British people would vote to leave, and therefore were unable to agree on any kind concessions on the freedom of movement which might have enabled Cameron to sell the deal to those disaffected Labour voters who turned out in great numbers in the north of England, unexpectedly, and therefore ensured a Leave majority.

There was some good news for the PM at this time as we learn on page 332. . . “the emergence of Teresa May as a supporter of the Remain campaign”. She did not sell her support cheap “insisting to Cameron that any deal include cracking down on “”sham marriages””, she also wanted spouses of EU nationals treated the same as those from non-EU countries. Of course, this was all pie-in-the-sky. The EU four principals just wouldn't allow it. Teresa was off the fence but the Leavers were greatly disappointed – believing she would be happy to support them. (Teresa is now the leader of the Conservative Party and PM)

Throughout the Cameron premiership, his partnership with George Osborne, Chancellor of the Exchequer, was the rock upon which these two Old Etonians based their success. Osborne was never in favour of the referendum in the first place. But, he was determined to win it. He did tell Cameron, “The EU is never – in my view - going to give Britain the benefits of membership without the costs.”

(George should run for prophet of the century, he would win hands down.)

Winding forward a few months and years, we now know that the Chancellor was spot on. There is no sign of a deal – even on the first part of the negotiations. The EU says three things have to be sorted before talks can move on to trading arrangements.

One – the rights of EU citizens in the UK after Brexit. Rumours that this is the easiest of the three issues abound, yet no concrete deal has been reached.

Looking back at the referendum itself, it is odd in the extreme that most of the UK citizens living in Europe were not eligible to vote – a fact hastily glossed over by Brexiteers.

Two – the Irish border question. This is a bit like the weather, everybody talks about it but no-one actually does anything about it. Everyone is adamant that there can be no “hard” border between Eire and Northern Ireland. But, no-one has yet brought forward concrete, acceptable plans as to how this is to be done.

For example, if there is no border and the common travel area between the UK and Ireland (which has existed since the 1920's) is maintained – how will one of the chief goals of Brexit be realised? Control of the borders is a Brexiteers mantra. So, an EU citizen travels to Dublin, they take the ferry from Dublin to Holyhead (current price £31). There are no border checks. The porous border the Brexiteers are demanding an end to is open to our EU citizen. Of course this mythical EU migrant will not have a right to work, but will that deter the casual labourer who is paid in cash, no questions asked? Who knows?

Three – the exit bill. The EU says that the UK has monetary commitments which must be honoured after Brexit. The UK government agrees – sort of. (The PM said recently that no remaining EU country will have to pay any more until the UK leaves 2017? Or 2019 – if there is the proposed two year “transition period”.) Any way this is sliced it's going to be a large sum of money – running into billions. Strange, all we ever heard from the Brexiteers was there would be £350 million a week for the NHS after we leave. I'm wondering how many of the 600 000 voted to leave with this “promise” ringing in their ears?

Back to the book. The role of Boris Johnson and Michael Gove in the campaign is examined in detail. I love the quote on page 149, attributed to Cameron - “There is a spectrum. George (Osborne) is more pro-European than me, so is Teresa. Then there's me, then there's you (Michael Gove) then there's Boris.

(And, Teresa is now in charge, still screaming at every opportunity, Brexit Means Brexit!)

Twenty pages later we still find Teresa defending Cameron against attacks by Gove and Johnson. The importance of these two “big beasts” of the Tory party to the eventual Brexit decision may be over-estimated, but it is still substantial. Boris is the darling of the Tories and some votes must have been swayed by his brand of campaigning. To this day, he still bangs on about the £350 million as being a realistic figure for the extra money for the NHS. (Give credit where credit is due – at least he is consistent. Whereas, hardly anyone else thinks any money for the NHS is likely to be forthcoming!)

There is a nice chapter analysing how and why the leaders of the official Get Out campaign decided not to use Nigel Farage very much in selling their message. They correctly identified that he is essentially a divisive figure, appealing to the already converted, whereas they needed to attract votes from other sections of the community. In this they succeeded brilliantly. In analysis, it was the normally hard-core Labour voters in the North and North-east of England that won the referendum. Jeremy Corbin's part in this has already been stated. Many of these folks were erstwhile UKIP supporters at heart. They may have voted Labour in general elections but their sympathies were Farage to the core. Everyone agrees that these people felt left behind in the global economy and have felt this way for years and years. Vote Leave just profited from the same tactics that have been used throughout history to appeal to this type of group. It's not your fault that you are poor, poorly educated, poorly housed, and poorly treated. It's the fault of the immigrants, the foreigners the non-native speakers of English. Vote for us and we'll “Take Back Our Country”. It's the Old Lie packaged in a new framework. Honest Abe was right You can fool all the people some of the time, and some of the people all the time, but you cannot fool all the people all the time - Abraham Lincoln

People are fairly stupid. I can say this without fear, for I will never run for public office. Politicians rarely say things with such clarity, even though they may privately think them. We have some excellent examples of the above in the section called It's the Economy Stupid. Pages 255-6 will suffice. “People had absolutely what the EU is or how it works at all to a point that beggars belief.” (see my first sentence para above). The second problem was that voters did not believe a single thing the Treasury said. People thought there would be a saving from leaving. The third argument relied on Cameron and Osborne winning the credibility argument. This, they failed dismally to do. Argument four: the Tory belief that the fear strategy – successful in 2014 and 2015 would win again. The Ship of State was heading blindly towards the rocks and no-one had the courage enough or sufficient insight to refocus the campaign. Cameron and Osborne were looking at the wrong polls and could not, or would not listen to those who advised a more vigorous attack on Vote Leave. Dave's concern was to hold the Tories together – which, you may remember is how he got in the referendum business in the first place. “People always complain about negative campaigning but in the final analysis it works!” The final problem was that even if Stronger In had tried to move the focus - the media had moved on. The economic argument was just boring. Immigration is far more likely to start a punch-up.

(There is no such thing as bad publicity!)

The chapter called “Blue on Blue is particularly well researched. One of Dave Cameron's biggest problems was highlighted in the exchange between Nikki Morgan (Education Secretary) and Priti Patel ( Employment Minister). On the day when parents received notice about their children starting school and receiving their first choice of a primary school, Patel chirps up to the media with comments about how immigration is the cause of any parental disappointment. Morgan was furious to be called to the House of Commons to explain why her cabinet colleague was hell-bent on sabotaging her department. So much for Cabinet collective responsibility. Here was a classic moment when Cameron could have invoked the principle of cabinet responsibility, sacked Patel and started a fight back against the Leavers in the Cabinet who were making it difficult to govern. (I suspect if anything keeps Dave awake at night it is his recollection of how Leavers in his Cabinet undermined both his Prime-ministerial authority and his attempts to keep his party on-board.)

It was left to Teresa May to put the knife into any chance of a Cabinet committed to, arguing for and campaigning for a Brexit deal. In a speech on 25 April she argued that the European Convention on Human Rights must go. (https://rightsinfo.org/wrote-european-convention-human-rights/) Another example of Pie-in-the-sky Tory dreaming. Shipman assures the readers that the Conservative leadership was more than slightly annoyed at May.

In Chapter 26 we get a good summation of how things went so wrong for the Remainers. First, though Remain won handily in London and Scotland they actually won too well, for their supporters were so mesmerised by the polls they just did not bother to turn out in sufficient numbers. The overall turnout was up by 8%, but down in Scotland and up only by 3% in London. To cap it all, there was torrential rain in parts of the capital suppressing the turnout. In Scotland, Stronger In had hoped to get support from SNP (Scottish Nationalist Party) voters. In fact they got only 55% - not the 70% they were counting on. The crusher came with the Labour vote. In London they turned out and voted for Remain. Everywhere else Labour supporters were voting to leave in big numbers. Given the demographics, Remain had no real chance, once Jeremy Corbyn had decided not to really campaign hard – leaving it to others to make the case.

In the Chapter called Jexit we learn the real story about Jeremy Corbyn's failures as Labour leader. It took almost no time before party big-wigs decided that he must go, after selling the Remain cause very short indeed. Margaret Hodge and Ann Coffee tabled a motion of no-confidence in the Labour leader. They had support from Lisa Tremble, Angela Smith and, predictably, Peter Mandelson. Tony Blair accused Corbyn of ignoring the voters who backed Brexit (presumably that's why they voted to leave, they were fed up with Labour's wishy-washy position). Unfortunately, getting Blair on-board probably ensured that the ship would be holed beneath the water line even before it had a chance to float, so toxic is his name in Labour circles now, though moderates saw this as the chance to get rid of Corbyn. Chukka Umunna, Rachel Reeves, Liz Kendall and Emma Reynolds jumped on board. A real coup was in the making. Corbyn out-foxed them all by simply refusing to be drawn into a confrontation or any argument of substance. Shrugging his shoulders and mouthing “well that's an interesting point” he simply ignored the criticism and bluffed his way through a shadow cabinet meeting. Corbyn eventually sacked Hillary Benn and eleven shadow cabinet members resigned, but he just carried on. Party grandees told him to go. He refused. His colleagues told him to go. He refused. I suspect if his own mother had told him to go he would have sacked her! All twenty Labour MEP's (Members of the European Parliament) told him to go. Ed Milliband, former leader of the Labour Party, told him to go. On the Tuesday, just forty Labour Members of Parliament backed Corbyn. 172 Labour MP's supported his removal. Two-thirds of the front bench team had resigned. It had been a perfectly organised and executed coup and the plotters assumed he would now resign. He did not.

A leadership contest was instigated instead. At first Angela Eagle said she would challenge Corbyn. She dropped out. Then Owen Smith took up the mantle. He was thrashed by Corbyn in the election. Jeremy realised throughout the election period that his part in delivering Brexit mattered not a jot to the party activists upon whose votes he depended. Owen Smith was dispatched to obscurity and Corbyn carried on. Story – end of.

(Not actually the end for after Teresa called a snap election, which she had promised on numerous occasions not to do, Jeremy confounded critics by losing, but only very narrowly. Teresa's hopes were dashed by the electorate and she stumbles on from one cock-uo to the next as Tory leader.)

After Cameron had resigned, It was then left to Michael Gove and Boris Johnson to slug it out for the leadership of the Tories – at first, Gove supported Johnson. Then, Gove chickened out. Gove decided to stab Boris in both the back and the front at the same time. He did. While these two “big-beasts” were mauling each other Teresa May and Andrea Leadsom were on the sidelines, presumably cheering them on. When the dust had settled only those two remained and poor Andrea had to withdraw after asserting (perhaps correctly) that because she had children and Teresa did not she would be better able to understand the concerns of the voters. Last man standing (or person if you prefer) Teresa May became PM. The “Anyone but Boris” campaign had worked, I'm particularly fond of Tim's descriptive Chapter Title for this whole saga – Brexecuted – sums it up very nicely indeed!

Racking up the pages now and heading for the conclusion. Page 582 contains Tim Shipman's summation of David Cameron. It is not altogether unflattering, Tim tell us that Cameron had to hold the referendum to satisfy the Conservative party. He fought the campaign with one fist behind his back, as he could not afford to alienate the Brexiteers. He essentially destroyed himself to save the Party and he did. At the end, he was able to hand the party over to Teresa May more or less intact. He sidelined UKIP. The Tories were still in charge. His political epitaph will have to wait for another day.

Conclusion.

It's taken 583 pages to get their so it better be good!

“The referendum represented a revolt of the provincial classes – ignored , maligned and impoverished – against the cosy metropolitan consensus on Europe, the benefits of immigration and the belief that national economic prosperity trumps personal experience of hardship.” So sayeth our author Tim, and he is not entirely wrong either.

“Looking back, the truth is this was lost a long time ago with the relentless drip, drip of anti-European propaganda.” - Alexander Burt.

“If no Tory leader for twenty years had said anything good about Europe, which broadly speaking was the case, then trying to turn that around in six months was impossible. It was beyond even David Cameron's campaigning skills.” - Damian Green

“Ryan Coetzee believes the campaign was hurt by the breakdown of trust between rulers and the ruled, and a flourishing of conspiracy theories.” Britain was caught up in something that is sweeping the West, involving distrust to the point of paranoia.

(Remind you of any other Western politician? Fatty Trump, for instance? There is little doubt that the Trump campaign learned some lessons from Brexit.)

“It involves growing fear of the “”other”” (my italics), whether that person is black, foreign or whatever they might be.”

(I'm thinking the average Briton has forgotten how standing pretty much alone in the face of Nazism and the forces upon which Hitler's criminal mob stood on the apex of was precisely the Brexiteers prescription of how to win the referendum. Repeat the BIG Lie over and over. Tell the people that your problems and inadequacies are not your fault - it's the Jews and the November criminals – they are the enemy. Just substitute the liberal elite for Jews and the EU for November criminals and it's the same argument over again.)

Ingrained Euroscepticism may be the backdrop to the story, but Cameron could have won with just a bit more support. 600, 000 votes seems a lot but it is not in the context of a national referendum.

(It's a bit odd, just as you could never find anyone who voted for Maggie Thatcher in the 80's; no-one now admits to voting Remain – despite the House of Commons being packed with Remainers.)

“, , , Vote Leave stuck to their message and they had a campaign leader who was streets ahead of anyone on the Remain side – https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dominic_Cummings

Ask anyone of the Leave side why they won and it is Dominic Cummings who get all the credit.

My contention, earlier in this piece, that it was the faceless leaders of the Leave campaign that won it is confirmed by almost everyone in the know.

Changing the question from yes/no to remain/leave may have been worth four percentage points to Vote Leave.

(Sounds like sour grapes, who can tell?)

In the end, the role of UKIP did become critical. By distancing itself from Nigel Farage and his cronies, Vote Leave was able to keep Tory voters on-board. Nigel Farage certainly connected with the voters in the North of England and their support was crucial.

“. . . if you believe in taking the voters seriously, blame the voters. If you are an adult living in Sunderland, where the motor industry and EU funding are critical to your livelihood, and you voted to leave, well, I'm sorry mate. I think that's your fault.”

(Turkeys don't vote for Christmas, but this time they did. Subsequent events have shown that Brexit has not produced a chasm for Britain to fall into, but it may still. By voting for the unknown, and opting for the unworkable the voters have put the country at risk. Of course we move on and the Tory efforts to unite behind a Brexit policy continue. We have to wait for some time before we will know. Interestingly, the voters, who are correctly identified as the real culprits, have moved on and they mostly say, “Get on with it”.)

“Probably the majority of the population did not grasp what was at stake in Britain leaving after forty years of integration to the EU, and the bulk of the press were determined not to enlighten them.”

Same-o – same-o. The voters are to blame. The Dewsbury Chavs, the Yarmouth Oicks, the Scousers, the Geordies, the Cornish in-breds, the Brummie Smegheads, the Black Country numpties, and the Lowestoft knuckle-draggers won it for Vote Leave.

Toxic Tony Blair deserves some the the blame as well. He failed to see how unlimited immigration would poison the country against the EU. He failed to see how the accession of the Eastern European countries would be viewed by the indigenous population. His Iraq war destabilised the Middle East and provided the spectre of immigration on the German model.

(Hard not to feel some sympathy for poor old Tony. His latest efforts to rally some support for staying in the EU have been scuppered by his own name. How the mighty have fallen.)

We may as well let Peter Mandelson have a go as well: “We lost because of the mountain of anti-EU sentiment in the country, driven by Rupert Murdoch and Paul Dacre and the rest of the Brexit press over many years, the hopelessness of the Labour leadership, and our own campaign's lack of dexterity in reading of public opinion . . . the achievement of 48% begins to look like a small miracle,”

(Yep.)

If Mandelson get a look in we ought to have Alistair Campbell as well: If it had just been Nigel Farage and the right-wing papers and a few Tory odd-balls it would have been fine. It wouldn't have happened without Boris Johnson and Michael Gove,”

(Who you will remember soon fell out big time and continue to rubbish each other whenever possible.)

The final word goes to the author, Tim Shipman: “No-one's ends justify limitless means. But it seems to me when we look at the US, where Donald Trump makes Aaron Banks or Nigel Farage look like Mary Poppins, or the rest of the EU itself, where parties mine more extreme reaches of the political spectrum than we do in Britain, that we are still lucky to have the politics we do. If we are getting furious about about the niceties of an overcooked £350 million a week to Brussels, or a dubious £4 300 cost to families, rather than rioting in the streets or real coups, political executions, or racial apartheid, we are not doing so badly as a country.”

My final word is somewhat different. Tim has taken 600-odd pages to detail how the Referendum was won and lost, yet he has not really reached the nub of the argument. The fact is True Brit won. The Little-Englanders triumphed over the young, the educated, the wealthy, the outward-looking and the rational. Only time will tell how much damage has and will be done not only to the UK but to Europe as well.